Introduction
The moderating effects of centralisation in wage bargaining on strike activity are considered as a stylised fact by many economists (Hoel, Moene, & Wallerstein, 1993 , p. 103. Berthold & Fehn, 1996 . The theoretical rationale is based on Hicks ' (1962) observation that strikes cannot occur in bargaining models based on perfect symmetric information, since rational agents can agree ex ante on the outcome resulting after a strike and thus avoid a harmful/costly strike. If strikes are caused by uncertainty and asymmetric information, centralisation of wage setting should have a moderating effect since wage setting at higher levels is based on aggregate and consequently more 'objective' data (e. g. productivity growth data provided by statistical offices) and these data are (symmetrically) available to all bargaining parties. Modern theoretical models of strikes (see e. g. Kennan & Wilson, 1989 , 1990 , 1993 are in line with this reasoning: Strikes serve as screening devices to extract private information (regarding profits, strike funds, willingness to strike of the work force etc.) of the opponent.
The popular information asymmetry argument is complemented with the notion of self serving bias put forward by Babcock & Loewenstein (1997) . They criticise the 'rational agents assumption' by arguing that direct involvement in negotiations biases perceptions (of fairness) in favour of the own position. As a consequence, the sum of claimed shares in the whole cake (the sum in dispute) is typically greater than one. In the light of the (mainly experimental) evidence cited in Babcock & Loewenstein's article, centralisation may help to decrease strike activity if centralised bargaining is conducted by more specialised and professional negotiators. Babcock & Loewenstein, however, put a question mark behind this interpretation by stressing that professionals are not necessarily immune against self serving bias.
Though the relation between centralisation in wage setting and strike activity seems to be clear in theory, empirical evidence on the issue is rare. The only exceptions seem to be Cameron (1984) and Schnabel (1993) . Cameron finds positive (bivariate) correlations between strike activity (measured as lost days due to strikes per year and workers) and the macroeconomic indicators inflation, unemployment and growth rate of earnings. Schnabel (1993) obtains significant negative rank correlations between strike activity and the centralisation indicators of Calmfors & Driffill (1988) and Bruno & Sachs (1985) for a cross section data set of OECD countries.
1
Though the theoretical literature on bargaining is concerned mainly with centralisation (measured as the dominant level of bargaining), empirical considerations and studies suggest that the degree of coordination (more importantly) between and within the bargaining parties matters as well. A glance at the data shows that national labour markets differ significantly with respect to the degree of coordination, and that the correlation between centralisation and coordination is only moderate. Furthermore the effects of coordination and centralisation in strikes appear to be quite different at the descriptive level. In we have listed mean and median strike duration by coordination and centralisation. To this aim we have sorted the countries intro three groups according to their scores in the OECD centralisation and coordination indicators. 2 In the upper panel of the relation between centralisation and strike volume is u-shaped for the mean as well as for the median, favouring the medium level. With respect to coordination the relation is hump-shaped for the mean and monotone decreasing for the median, clearly favouring high degrees of coordination. A further important stylised fact from simple descriptive measures (lower panel of the table) regards the clear negative trend. Since these effects may, however, be generated by spurious correlations (i. e. are not partial effects), we have to apply regression techniques in order to disentangle matters.
Outline of the Empirical Model
We explain strike volume (lost working days per 1000 workers and year due to strike actions) by indicators for coordination or the level of centralisation of bargaining and several control variables (explained below). Our choice of coordination and centralisation indicators is OECD04 (2004) 
